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Abstract— The downlink communications are vulnerable to1
intelligent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) jamming attack. In this2
paper, we propose a novel anti-intelligent UAV jamming strategy,3
in which the ground users can learn the optimal trajectory to4
elude such jamming. The problem is formulated as a stackelberg5
dynamic game, where the UAV jammer acts as a leader and6
the ground users act as followers. First, as the UAV jammer is7
only aware of the incomplete channel state information (CSI)8
of the ground users, for the first attempt, we model such9
leader sub-game as a partially observable Markov decision10
process (POMDP). Then, we obtain the optimal jamming tra-11
jectory via the developed deep recurrent Q-networks (DRQN)12
in the three-dimension space. Next, for the followers sub-game,13
we use the Markov decision process (MDP) to model it. Then we14
obtain the optimal communication trajectory via the developed15
deep Q-networks (DQN) in the two-dimension space. We prove16
the existence of the stackelberg equilibrium and derive the closed-17
form expression for the stackelberg equilibrium in a special case.18
Moreover, some insightful remarks are obtained and the time19
complexity of the proposed defense strategy is analyzed. The20
simulations show that the proposed defense strategy outperforms21
the benchmark strategies.22
Index Terms— UAV, jamming, Markov decision process, deep23
Q-networks.24
I. INTRODUCTION25
W ITH the urgent demands of high-speed data transmis-26 sion in wireless communications, various technolo-27
gies have been explored to improve the network capacity,28
i.e., massive multiple-input multiple-output (massive-MIMO)29
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and millimeter wave (mmWave) communication. Recently, 30
the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been adopted to 31
improve the network capacity. For example, compared to 32
the ground communications, UAV can provide strong line-of- 33
sight (LoS) links and small path-loss exponent to the ground 34
users when it is used as the base station. Therefore, by optimiz- 35
ing the UAV trajectory and transmission strategies, the UAVs 36
can be used to boost the network capacity [1]–[4]. 37
When considering the security issues in wireless commu- 38
nication systems, UAVs can be exploited as different com- 39
ponents [5]–[13]. As security components, UAVs can be 40
used by the legitimate users. For example, since the friendly 41
jammer can protect the confidential messages by transmitting 42
the artificial noise [14], [15], UAV has been utilized as a 43
friendly jammer to protect the ground users away from the 44
eavesdropper. Specifically, with the assist of an air-to-ground- 45
friendly UAV jammer, the system security can be improved 46
when the location of the eavesdropper is unknown [6]. Then, 47
UAVs can work as relays to forward the message to improve 48
the communication quality [10]. In [11], a reinforcement 49
learning based UAV relay has been studied to against the smart 50
jamming in vehicular ad hoc networks. Additionally, some 51
work has attempted to combine UAV relay and UAV friendly 52
jammer to enhance communication security. For example, 53
a dual-UAV enabled secure communication system has been 54
investigated in [7], in which one UAV can work as a relay to 55
communicate with multiple ground users and another UAV can 56
work as a friendly jammer to jam the ground eavesdropper. 57
As malicious components, UAVs can be exploited by the 58
illegitimate users [12], [13]. The authors in [8] have shown 59
that malicious UAVs equipped with cameras and multi-spectral 60
sensors can eavesdrop the privacy of legitimate users. Due to 61
the LoS links and small path-loss exponent, UAV jamming 62
can significantly block the data transmission and degrade 63
communication quality of service (QoS), which is more serious 64
than ground jamming. Therefore, anti-UAV jamming problem 65
is worth investigating. 66
Some meaningful work has been developed to address 67
the malicious UAV jamming problem [16]–[19]. Particularly, 68
a zero-sum pursuit-evasion game has been formulated to 69
compute optimal strategies, which aims to evade the attack 70
of an UAV jammer [16]. A smart UAV attacker, who can 71
specify the attack type, such as jamming, eavesdropping, and 72
spoofing, has been considered in [17] and the reinforcement 73
learning based power allocation strategies have been proposed 74
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to defend against such attack. However, the aforementioned75
anti-UAV jamming work are based on some ideal assumptions,76
i.e., the perfect observation. More recent work has considered77
imperfect observation in anti-ground jamming but few in78
anti-UAV jamming [18]–[24]. For example, with consider-79
ing the co-channel mutual interference and the incomplete80
information, i.e., incomplete channel state information (CSI),81
the competition between UAV users and jammers have been82
investigated by using a Bayesian stackelberg game [18]. The83
authors in [19] have designed a secure communication system84
to deal with the joint impact of UAV smart attack and imper-85
fect channel estimation. The authors in [20] has formulated86
the jamming game with incomplete information, i.e., the other87
user’s identities, as a Bayesian game and discussed the perfor-88
mance of this game. The prospect theoretic analysis has been89
used to model anti-jamming communications [21]. Moreover,90
a Bayesian stackelberg game with incomplete information has91
been formulated to analyze the jammer in [22], [23]. Likewise,92
the impact of observation error of a smart jammer has been93
evaluated in a stackelberg anti-jamming game and the Nash94
equilibrium has been derived [24]. As aforementioned, only95
[18], [19] have considered imperfect observations in anti-UAV96
jamming problem. Meanwhile, only [19] has considered an97
intelligent UAV attacker with imperfect observations. In other98
words, limited work has considered intelligent UAV jamming,99
which can easily learn the optimal attack strategy in complex100
communication environments, even with imperfect observa-101
tion, i.e., incomplete CSI.102
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI)103
in communications [25], [26], such an intelligent UAV jam-104
ming becomes more reality and more harmful than we have105
ever considered. One powerful tool is reinforcement learning,106
by which the intelligent agent can choose jamming action107
based on the environments and maximize the reward. This108
reward is called long-term cumulative reward, which is decided109
by a series of time events. The Q-learning is a model-free110
reinforcement learning method, which can learn the optimal111
strategy based on the long-term cumulative reward with an112
end-to-end approach. Then, to address the curse of high113
dimensionality in Q-learning, the Deep Q-network (DQN)114
has been developed by Google DeepMind, which combines115
Q-learning with convolutional neural network (CNN). It can116
be used to learn the optimal strategy in a large state space [27].117
Whereas, the DQN cannot perform well with the imperfect118
observations. Then, to learn the optimal strategy with the119
imperfect observation, the deep recurrent Q-network (DRQN)120
has been introduced, which is a combination of a long short121
term memory (LSTM) and a DQN [28]. With AI, some incred-122
ible jamming attacks have been realizing, i.e., [17], [29], which123
makes the anti-UAV jamming problem more challenging.124
In this paper, we consider the scenario that both the UAV125
jammer and the ground users are intelligent agents. On the126
one hand, the UAV jammer can learn the optimal jamming127
trajectory via the imperfect observation. On the other hand,128
the ground users can learn the optimal communication trajec-129
tory to elude the UAV jamming. To the best of our knowledge,130
“How do ground users defend against intelligent UAV jamming131
attack using AI?” is still an open problem. The specific 132
contributions of our work are summarized as follows: 133
• For the first time, we consider the scenario that both the 134
UAV jammer and the ground users are intelligent agents, 135
in which an UAV jammer can block the data transmission 136
of the ground users and the ground users are capable 137
of defending against the intelligent UAV jamming to the 138
greatest extent. 139
• For the ground users, we propose a novel anti-intelligent 140
UAV jamming strategy, in which the optimal trajectory 141
of each ground user is obtained. Specifically, the anti- 142
intelligent UAV jamming problem is formulated as a 143
stackelberg dynamic game. The incomplete CSI is consid- 144
ered in the game and the optimal trajectories are learned 145
via DRQN and DQN, respectively. 146
• Some insightful remarks are obtained from the theory and 147
the simulations: i) we prove that the optimal trajectory of 148
each ground user exists; ii) we prove the existence of 149
the stackelberg equilibrium in the game; iii) to maximize 150
long-term cumulative reward, the action choices of UAV 151
jammer is different from that of maximizing the imme- 152
diate reward. 153
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 154
we present the system model and the problem formulation. 155
In Section III, we propose the anti-intelligent UAV jam- 156
ming strategy and the corresponding discussions. Simulations 157
are presented in Section IV and conclusions are given 158
in Section V. 159
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 160
In this section, we first give the system model, then, 161
we formulate the optimization problem. For ease of reference, 162
important symbols are summarized in Table I. 163
A. System Model 164
We consider the downlink transmissions between a base sta- 165
tion and ground users under the threat of a UAV jammer, which 166
is shown in Fig. 1. In the following, if no confusions occur, 167
the users refer to the ground users. Denote J as the UAV 168
jammer, B as the base station and i ∈ {1, · · · , U} as user i. 169
We assume that the location of the base station is fixed with 170
height HB, while the users and the UAV jammer are mobile at 171
constant velocities in each time slot. Considering the resource- 172
limited devices, all of them are equipped with single antenna 173
and communicate with the base station by adopting frequency 174
division multiple access (FDMA). The total bandwidth is B 175
Hz, and we consider the worst case that the UAV performs 176
barrage jamming, which can jam the full bandwidth of the 177
network [30]. The UAV jammer and the users are considered 178
as intelligent agents, who can learn the optimal actions to 179
maximize their long-term cumulative rewards, i.e., signal-to- 180
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) [31], respectively. The 181
locations of base station B, an arbitrary user i, and the 182
UAV jammer J are denoted as (0, 0, HB), (xi, yi, 0), and 183
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SYMBOLS
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram. The network includes one base station, U ground
users and a UAV jammer, then the network is transformed into a solid
figure. The UAV jammer can fly in a three-dimension space, the ground
users can move in a two-dimension space, moreover, the base station is in a
three-dimension space and deployed at the center of the “x0y” plane.
(xJ , yJ , zJ ), respectively. Denote the mapping of UAV jam-184
mer action space as185
AJ = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 0,−1), (−1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0),186
(0, 1, 0), (0,−1, 0)},187
which represents moving directions including stay, up, down, 188
left, right, forward, backword. Likewise, we map the user 189
action space as 190
Ai = {(0, 0, 0), (−1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0,−1, 0)}, 191
which represents flight directions including stay, left, right, 192
forward, backword. In time slot t, the UAV jammer J chooses 193
an action atJ ∈ AJ to determine the flight direction, and user 194
i chooses an action ati ∈ Ai to determine its moving direction. 195
The channel coefficient from base station B to user i is 196
denoted as hBi =
√
d−ηBi h˜Bi, where dBi represents the distance 197
between base station B and user i, η is the path loss exponent 198
and h˜Bi is the small-scale fading, which follows zero-mean 199
complex Gaussian distribution with unit variance. In addition, 200
the communication channel between UAV jammer and user i 201
is modeled as an air-to-ground channel, which contains three 202
parts, including strong LoS, reflected nonline-of-sight (NLoS), 203
and small-scale fading. In general, the influence of small-scale 204
fading is smaller than LoS and NLoS, therefore, the small- 205
scale fading is neglected [32], [33]. The path loss of the 206
air-to-ground channel between UAV jammer and user i is 207
denoted as [34] 208
PL(J , i) =
{
βLoS|dJ i|−α, for LoS link,
βNLoS|dJ i|−α, for NLoS link,
(1) 209
where dJ i =
√
(xi − xJ )2 + (yi − yJ )2 + z2J is the distance 210
between UAV jammer J and user i, α is the path-loss 211
exponent for the air-to-ground channel, and βLoS and βNLoS 212
are additional attenuation factors for LoS link and NLoS 213
link, respectively. The probability of LoS connection, PLoS, 214
depends on the elevation angle θi between user i and UAV, 215
the communication environment, the surrounding buildings 216
density, and the height of the UAV jammer, HJ , which can 217
be represented as 218
PLoS =
1
1 + Φexp(−Ψ[θi − Φ]) . (2) 219
In particular, Φ and Ψ are S-curve parameters, which depend 220
on communication environment, i.e., Φ = 150 and Ψ = 15 221
are the common settings for urban areas, the angle is 222
θi =
180
π
arcsin(
zJ
dJ i
) 223
and the probability of NLoS is PNLoS = 1 − PLoS. Hence, 224
the expectation of the jamming power received at the user i 225
is given by [32] 226
IJ i = pJPLoSβLoS|dJ i|−α + pJPNLoSβNLoS|dJ i|−α, (3) 227
where pJ is the power budget of the UAV jammer. Then, 228
the received SINR at user i can be denoted as 229
Γi =
pBd
−η
Bi |h˜Bi|2
IJ i + σ2
, (4) 230
where pB is the power budget of the base station and σ2 is 231
the noise variance. 232
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B. Problem Formulation233
Since the UAV jammer is a malicious user, the UAV jammer234
cannot obtain the complete observation information of the235
users, i.e., CSI. The partially observable information that236
the UAV jammer known is the location of the users, which237
represents as the distances from the users to the base station,238
giving by239
dBi =
√
x2i + y
2
i + H
2
B, i ∈ {1, · · · , U}.240
Meanwhile, the information observed by the users con-241
tinuously is the jamming power received from the UAV.1242
Considering the hierarchical interactions among UAV jam-243
mer and the users, we utilize a stackelberg dynamic game244
G〈{J , i}, {dJ , di}, {rJ , ri}〉 to formulate the anti-UAV jam-245
ming problem, namely, anti-jamming elude game. In the246
formulated game, we model the foresighted UAV jammer J247
as a leader and the myopic users i ∈ {1, · · · , U} as followers.248
The UAV jammer first chooses its action aJ ∈ AJ , then each249
user chooses its corresponding action ai ∈ Ai. We assume250
that the location of the user i is (xi, yi, 0) in the previous251
time slot and (x′i, y′i, 0) in the current time slot with action252
ai, i.e., (x′i, y′i, 0) = (xi, yi, 0) + ai. The location of the253
UAV jammer J is (xJ , yJ , zJ ) in the previous time slot254
and (x′J , y′J , z′J ) in the current time slot with action aJ ,255
i.e., (x′J , y′J , z′J ) = (xJ , yJ , zJ ) + aJ .256
In this case, the immediate reward of user i can be given as257
ri[T (aJ ),L (ai)] =
pBd
−η
Bi |h˜Bi|2
IJ i + σ2
− CUdi, (5)258
where T (aJ ) = (x′J , y′J , z′J ) denotes the current trajectory259
of the jammer with action aJ , L (ai) = (x′i, y′i, 0) denotes260
the current trajectory of user i with action ai, CU is the unit261
energy cost of the user, i.e., mobility cost per unit distance.262
The distance between UAV jammer J and user i is263
dJ i =
√
(x′J − x′i)2 + (y′J − y′i)2 + z′2J ,264
the distance from the base station to user i is265
dBi =
√
x′2i + y′
2
i + H2B266
and the moving distance per time slot is267
di =
√
(x′i − xi)2 + (y′i − yi)2.268
The UAV jammer’s immediate reward in the current time slot269
can be given by270
rJ [T (aJ ),L (ai)] =
U∑
i=1
IJ i
pBd
−η
Bi |h˜Bi|2 + σ2
− CJ dJ , (6)271
where CJ is the unit energy cost of the UAV jammer,272
i.e., flight cost per unit distance, and the flight distance per273
time slot can be denoted as274
dJ =
√
(x′J − xJ )2 + (y′J − yJ )2 + (z′J − zJ )2.275
1This is a reasonable assumption since that the jamming is continuous and
the users can estimate it in each inter frame gap.
The goal of the formulated optimization problem is to 276
maximize the long-term cumulative rewards of UAV jammer 277
and users, respectively. To maximize jammer’s long-term 278
cumulative reward RJ , we need to find the optimal jamming 279
trajectory for the UAV jammer and then to maximize each 280
user’s long-term cumulative reward Ri, we need to find the 281
optimal communication trajectory for each user, with the 282
constraints of flight distance and moving distance per time 283
slot. The formulated optimization problem can be given as 284
max
aJ ,ai
RJ [T (aJ ),L (ai)], 285
Ri[T ∗(aJ ),L (ai)], 286
s.t. |aJ | ≤ 1, (7) 287
|ai| ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, · · · , U}, (8) 288
where RJ =
∑∞
k=0 γ
krJ (k) and Ri =
∑∞
k=0 γ
kri(k) denote 289
k steps long-term cumulative rewards of each time slot with 290
discount factor γ, (7) represents the flight distance of UAV 291
jammer per time slot, (8) represents the moving distance of 292
user i per time slot. Due to the mobility of the network, 293
the communication environment is dynamic and complex. 294
The formulated optimization problem faces several challenges, 295
including the need to obtain the complete CSI, the need to 296
obtain the channel state transition probability, as well as the 297
difficulty to obtain the convexity of the problem. Therefore, 298
to solve the formulated optimal problem, we propose the 299
following strategies. 300
III. DEEP LEARNING BASED OPTIMAL STRATEGY 301
In this section, we propose a novel anti-intelligent UAV 302
jamming strategy to defend against UAV jammer. Particularly, 303
we analyze the optimal jamming trajectory and the optimal 304
communication trajectory. 305
A. The Optimal Jamming Trajectory 306
Since the wireless channel environment is dynamic and 307
complex, we quantize the channel hBi into a finite channel 308
state space S = {h1Bi, · · · , hKBi}, i ∈ {1, · · · , U}, and model it 309
as a Markov chain with finite states [35]. Then, by partitioning 310
the flight space of the UAV jammer J into a finite number of 311
states, i.e., L states, the flight state space of the UAV jammer 312
J can be denoted as 313
SJ = {(xJ ,1, yJ ,1, zJ ,1), · · · , (xJ ,L, yJ ,L, zJ ,L)}. 314
Again, we quantize the motion state space of the users into 315
M states, which is denoted as 316
Si = {(xi,1, yi,1, 0), · · · , (xi,M , yi,M , 0)}, i ∈ {1, · · · , U}. 317
To simplify the case, we model a virtual user, V , as a target 318
user, which is a virtual point that related to the users in 319
the network. The initial location of the virtual user can be 320
decided by 321
(xV , yV , 0) =
(∑U
i=1 wixi∑U
i=1 wi
,
∑U
i=1 wiyi∑U
i=1 wi
, 0
)
, (9) 322
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where wi is the initial location weight of user i. Then,323
the quantized motion state space of the virtual user can be324
denoted as325
SV = {(xV,1, yV,1, 0), · · · , (xV,M , yV,M , 0)}.326
Remark 1: Since the communication fairness among users,327
the base station will allocate more bandwidth to the user far328
away from it. Thus, the initial value of the location weights329
wi is proportion to the distance between base station and user330
i, i.e., wi ∝ dBi. As UAV flies at very high altitudes, it can331
obtain the location of each user, then it can approximately332
estimate the initial location weights wi based on the distance333
between base station and user i, i.e., wi = dBi U
i=1 dBi
. As the334
users moving, the location weight wi will be adjusted with the335
time. Let Aw = b, where336
w = (w1 w2 · · · wU )†,337
A =
⎛
⎝ x1 x2 · · · xUy1 y2 · · · yU
0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎠ ,338
B = (A,b) =
⎛
⎝ x1 x2 · · · xU xVy1 y2 · · · yU yV
0 0 · · · 0 0
⎞
⎠ .339
Excepting the special case ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , U}, xi = yi, xV =340
yV , we can find that the location of the virtual user can be341
represented by the locations of all the users, linearly. The342
special case means that all users are on the surface diagonal343
of the solid figure and the UAV jammer is not. Since the344
communication environment is complex and the user number is345
large, the special case above is hard to occur in practice. In the346
following analysis, we assume that the location relationship347
between virtual user and users are always linear.348
The UAV jammer’s immediate reward in (6) can be349
transformed to350
rJ [T (aJ ),L (aV )] =
IJV
pBd
−η
BV |h˜BV |2 + σ2
− CJ dJ , (10)351
where the distance352
dBV =
√
x′2V + y′
2
V + H2B.353
Then the optimization problem for the UAV jammer J is354
formulated as choosing action aJ to maximize UAV jammer’s355
long-term cumulative reward under the constraint of moving356
distance per time slot, which can be given by357
max
aJ
RJ [T (aJ ),L (aV )],358
s.t. |aJ | ≤ 1. (11)359
However, the complete CSI of the virtual user is not360
known to the UAV jammer. Considering the dynamic channel361
environments, we model this process as a partially observable362
Markov decision process (POMDP) [28]. Define a POMDP as363
a 6-tuple 〈S,AJ , P, rJ ,O,Ω〉, where364
• S is the channel state space;365
• AJ is the action space;366
• P (·|s, aJ ) is the transition probability of the next state,367
conditioned on action aJ being chosen in state s ∈ S;368
• rJ [s,T (aJ )] is the immediate reward obtained when 369
action aJ is taken in state s, and the symbol 370
rJ [s,T (aJ )] is omitted to rJ ,s if no confusion occurs; 371
• O is the observation state space, which is equal to the 372
motion state space SV ; 373
• Ω(·|s, aJ ) is the probability of the possible observation, 374
conditioned on action aJ being taken to reach state s. 375
According to the observation o, the probability of being in 376
state s is defined by the belief b, which can be updated by 377
b′(s′) =
1
Θ
[
Ω(o′|s′, aJ )
∑
s∈S
P (s′|s, aJ )b(s)
]
, (12) 378
where 379
Θ =
∑
s′∈S
Ω(o′|s′, aJ )
∑
s∈S
P (s′|s, aJ )b(s) 380
is the normalization function of the belief and the belief is 381
initialized at b0 = P0, i.e., P0 = 0.1. Define the action 382
selection policy as π : b → aJ . Then, solving the POMDP 383
is to find the optimal action selection policy π∗ : b∗ → a∗J , 384
yields the maximum expected reward for each belief. This 385
maximum expected reward can be obtained by the Bellman 386
equation 387
V ∗b = max
aJ∈AJ
[
rJ ,b + γ
∑
o∈O
Ω(o|b, aJ )V ∗b′
]
, (13) 388
where 389
rJ ,b =
∑
s∈S
rJ ,sb(s) 390
represents the expected reward over the belief distribution. 391
For any partially observable with known state transition 392
probability P (·|s, aJ ), the problem can be reformulated as 393
a belief-MDP, which uses belief state space M as a new 394
state space instead of the original channel state space S [36]. 395
The near-optimal solution to the belief-MDP can be solved 396
by Q-learning [37]. By storing and updating a Q-value func- 397
tion for each belief in the system, the optimal action a∗J 398
with respect to the maximum Q-value is obtained. However, 399
in practice, the belief space is large and the state transition 400
probability is unknown, the Q-learning is impossible to store 401
and update the Q-value function. Therefore, we use the model- 402
free approach to learn the trajectory, which directly exploits 403
the sequence of 	 historical observation-action pairs, Ot = 404
{ot−, at−J , · · · , ot−1, at−1J } to learn the optimal jamming 405
trajectory [28]. The DRQN that combines Q-learning with a 406
recurrent convolutional neural network (CNN), is developed. 407
The framework is shown in Fig. 2. In each Q-network, 408
the neural network consists of two convolutional layers, one 409
long short-term memory (LSTM) layer, and one fully con- 410
nected (FC) layer. The first convolutional layer convolves F1 411
filters of n1 × n1 with stride 1, and the second convolutional 412
layer convolves F2 filters of n2×n2 with stride 1. The LSTM 413
layer consists of C1 rectifier unites and FC layer includes |AJ | 414
rectifier unites. 415
Solving the formulated POMDP problem via the developed 416
DRQN, the Q-values are parameterized by Q(φ, aJ ; θ), where 417
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Fig. 2. The developed DRQN framework, which includes one main Q-
network and one target Q-network. Each Q-network consists of one input
layer, two convolutional layers, one LSTM layer, and one FC layer.
θ is the weight parameter set of the Q-network. In time slot418
t, sequence Ot can be preprocessed to an n0 × n0 matrix419
φt, then input this matrix to the recurrent CNN to calculate420
Q(φt, aJ ; θ). Once θ is learned, the Q-values are determined.421
Then, the UAV jammer’s experience etJ (φt, atJ , rtJ , φt+1) is422
stored in the replay memory DJ = {e1J , · · · , etJ }. When423
training the DRQN, mini-batches of experience egJ , 1 ≤ g ≤ t424
from the pool of the reply memory is randomly chosen to425
update the weight parameter set θ via a stochastic gradient426
descent (SGD). The weight parameter set θ is updated via the427
loss function428
L(θ) = Eφ,a,r,φ′
[(
rJ ,φ + γ max
a′J
Q(φ′, a′J ; θ
−)429
−Q(φ, aJ ; θ)
)2]
, (14)430
where the symbol θ− is only updated with θ every N steps431
from the same Q-network. The gradient of loss function with432
respect to the weight parameter set θ is obtained by433
∇θL(θ) = Eφ,a,r,φ′
[(
rJ ,φ + γ max
a′J
Q(φ′, a′J ; θ
−)434
−Q(φ, aJ ; θ)
)∇θQ(φ, aJ ; θ)]. (15)435
To balance the exploration and exploitation, we utilize the436
-greedy policy πJ to select the action with greedy probability437
P (aJ = a∗J ) = 1 − , where  ∈ (0, 1) is a small positive438
value, i.e.,  = 0.01. Then, the optimal jamming trajectory at439
time t can be denoted by440
T ∗(atJ )=(xJ 0, yJ 0, zJ0) + a
0
J
∗
+ a1J
∗
+· · ·+ atJ ∗, (16)441
where (xJ 0, yJ 0, zJ 0) is the initial location of the UAV442
jammer.443
B. The Optimal Communication Trajectory444
In the follower sub-game, the virtual user V chooses the445
optimal action a∗V ∈ AV based on the observation of the UAV446
jammer, and obtains the optimal communication trajectory 447
L ∗(aV ) by solving 448
max
aV
RV [T ∗(aJ ),L (aV )], 449
s.t. |aV | ≤ 1. (17) 450
Since the optimal action a∗V of the virtual user depends on the 451
observation of the UAV jammer, we can derive the insightful 452
property between action aV and action aJ , which is given by 453
the following theorem. 454
Theorem 1: The communication trajectory is decided by 455
the observation-action transition of the UAV jammer, and the 456
action transition probability P (aJ |a′J ) follows an indepen- 457
dent and identically distribution finite state Markov chain. 458
Proof: Please see Appendix A. 459
From Theorem 1, the optimizing communication trajectory 460
problem can be modeled as solving a MDP problem, in which 461
the communication trajectory of the virtual user is determined 462
by the state SJ with respect to the action of the UAV jammer, 463
i.e., s′J = sJ + a′J . The MDP can be denoted as a 4-tuple 464
〈SJ ,AV , rV , P (·|sJ , aV )〉, where 465
• SJ is the flight state space, 466
• AV is the action space, 467
• rV [sJ ,L (aV )] is the immediate reward obtained when 468
action aV is taken in state sJ , and the symbol 469
rV [sJ ,L (aV )] is omitted to rV,sJ if no confusion 470
occurs. 471
• P (·|sJ , aV ) is the transition probability of the next state, 472
conditioned on action aV being chosen in state sJ ∈ SJ . 473
We have 474
P (st+1J |stJ , aV ) = P (stJ + at+1J |stJ , aV ) 475
= P (a0J + · · ·+ at+1J |a0J + · · ·+ atJ , aV ) 476
= P (at+1J |atJ , aV ). (18) 477
Then, we apply the Q-learning to derive the optimal communi- 478
cation trajectory of virtual user L ∗(aV ) with the observation 479
of the UAV jammer. 480
Considering the state space SJ is large, we develop the 481
CNN to approximate the Q-value function. Then, we utilize the 482
DQN to estimate the Q-value with the weight parameter ξ [27]. 483
The developed DQN framework is shown in Fig. 3, including 484
the main Q-network and the target Q-network. Specifically, 485
in time slot t, the sequence of 	 historical state-action pairs 486
St = {st−J , at−V , · · · , st−1J , at−1V } is preprocessed to an n×n 487
matrix ϕt as the input to the CNN. The experience of the 488
user etV (ϕ
t, atV , r
t
V , ϕ
t+1) is stored in the replay memory 489
DV = {e1V , · · · , etV }. When training the DQN, mini-batches 490
of experience egV , 1 ≤ g ≤ t from the pool of the replay 491
memory is randomly chosen to update weight parameter set 492
ξ via a SGD. The weight parameter set ξ is updated via the 493
following loss function 494
L(ξ) = Eϕ,a,r,ϕ′
[(
rV,sJ + γ max
a′V
Q(ϕ′, a′V ; ξ
−) 495
−Q(ϕ, aV ; ξ)
)2]
, 496
where the symbol ξ− is updated from the same Q-network 497
to minimize the loss function in every N steps. The gradient 498
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Fig. 3. The developed DQN framework, which includes one main Q-network
and one target Q-network. Each Q-network consists of one input layer, two
convolutional layers and two FC layers.
of loss function with respect to the weight parameter set ξ is499
obtained by500
∇ξL(ξ) = Eϕ,a,r,ϕ′
[(
rV,sJ + γ max
a′V
Q(ϕ′, a′V ; ξ
−)501
−Q(ϕ, aV ; ξ)
)∇ξQ(ϕ, aV ; ξ)]. (19)502
The optimal action in -greedy policy πV with greedy proba-503
bility P (aV = a∗V ) = 1−  is given by504
a∗V = arg max
aJ∈AJ
Q(ϕ, aV ; ξ). (20)505
The optimal communication trajectory of virtual userL ∗(aV )506
in time slot t is given by507
L ∗(atV ) = (xV 0, yV 0, 0) + a
0
V
∗
+ a1V
∗
+ · · ·+ atV ∗, (21)508
where (xV 0, yV 0, 0) is the initial location of the virtual user.509
However, the optimal communication trajectory of virtual510
user is an equivalent solution, as described in (9). Actually,511
we have to prove the existence of the optimal communication512
trajectory for each user after using the DQN, thus, we derive513
the following lemma and theorem.514
Lemma 1: For any multivariate function f(c1, · · · , cU ) =515
f1(c1) + · · ·+ fU (cU ), if516
∂2 fi(ci)
∂2ci
 0, ∀i ∈ 1, · · · , U (22)517
then, the optimal solution that satisfies f∗(c1, · · · , cU ) =518
f∗1 (c1) + · · ·+ f∗U (cU ).519
Proof: Please see Appendix B.520
Theorem 2: For the optimal communication trajectory of521
virtual user in each time slot, denoted as L ∗V , the optimal522
communication trajectory L ∗i , i ∈ 1, · · · , U that maximizes523
the long-term cumulative reward for each user is existent.524
Proof: Please see Appendix C.525
Remark 2: The relationship between optimal communica-526
tion trajectory of virtual user and optimal communication527
trajectories of users are linear. In addition, we can further528
derive that if the optimal communication trajectory of virtual529
user exists, then the optimal communication trajectory of each 530
user is existent but not unique, which can be proved as follow: 531
Based on the non-homogeneous linear equations, we can 532
rewrite (33) as (A∗w)† = b∗†, where 533
A∗ =
⎛
⎝ a∗1a∗2
a∗3
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ x∗1 x∗2 · · · x∗Uy∗1 y∗2 · · · y∗U
0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎠ , 534
w = (w1 w2 · · · wU )†, 535
b∗ = (b1, b2, b3)† = (x∗V y
∗
V 0)
†. 536
Let (a∗jw)† = bj ,pj = (w†, bj), j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then for given 537
w and ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have Rank(w†) = Rank(pj) = 538
1 < U , the solutions of x∗i , y∗i , i ∈ {1, · · · , U} are existent 539
but not unique. 540
As per Theorem 2, the optimal communication trajectory of 541
each user in time slot t is given by 542
L ∗(ati)=(xi0, yi0, 0) + a
0
i
∗
+ a1i
∗
+ · · ·+ ati∗, i ∈ 1, · · · , U 543
(23) 544
where (xi0, yi0, 0) is the initial location of user i. 545
C. Discussions 546
Here, we prove the existence of stackelberg equilibrium in 547
the game, and then we analyze the time complexity of the 548
proposed defense strategy. 549
1) Stackelberg Equilibrium: 550
Definition 1: Given a two-player stackelberg game, where 551
player 1 as a leader wants to maximize a reward function 552
r1(a1, a2) and player 2 as a follower wants to maximize a 553
reward function r2(a1, a2) by choosing a1, a2 from action 554
space A1 and A2, respectively. Then the pair (a∗1, a∗2) is called 555
a stackelberg equilibrium if for any a1 belonging to A1 and 556
a2 belonging to A2, satisfies 557
r1(a∗1, a2) ≥ r1(a1, a2) 558
r2(a∗1, a
∗
2) ≥ r2(a∗1, a2(a∗1)), (24) 559
where the reward r2(a∗1, a∗2) = maxa2 r2(a∗1, a2(a∗1)) [38]. 560
Remark 3: We note that the stackelberg equilibrium with 561
the UAV jammer as a leader is the optimal solution for it if the 562
UAV jammer chooses its action a∗J first, and if the goal of the 563
virtual user is to maximize RV , while that of the UAV jammer 564
is to maximize RJ . If the leader chooses any other action 565
aJ , then the follower will choose an action a˜∗V to maximize 566
RV . In this case, the reward of the UAV jammer will be less 567
than that when the stackelberg equilibrium with UAV jammer 568
is used. 569
Theorem 3: In the proposed game with one UAV jammer 570
J and one virtual user V , the DQN based optimal trajectory 571
pairs [T ∗(aJ ),L ∗(aV )] is a stackelberg equilibrium. 572
Proof: Please see Appendix B. 573
Remark 4: Theoretically, a stackelberg equilibrium can be 574
achieved with probability one, if the DQN is well trained. 575
To balance the exploration and exploitation with respect to 576
a large state-action space, it has a probability 2− 2 that the 577
system cannot obtain the optimal communication trajectory 578
with respect to a stackelberg equilibrium in DQN training. 579
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TABLE II
THE TIME COMPLEX OF THE PROPOSED DEFENSE STRATEGY
Since  ∈ {0, 1} is a small positive value, the probability event580
2−2 is extremely small, i.e.,  = 0.05, 2−2 = 0.0975. Such581
occasional small probability event can help to fully explored582
and exploited the large state-action space and help to obtain583
the global optimal solution, then, the DQN can be well trained.584
Corollary 1: If the initial location of the UAV jammer and585
the virtual user satisfies xJ 0 = yJ 0 and xV 0 = yV 0, and586
the channel is quasi-static block fading, then the anti-jamming587
elude game has a stackelberg equilibrium [T ∗(aJ ),L ∗(aV )],588
which is given by589
T ∗(aJ ) = (
xJ 0 − xV 0+xV 0zJ 0
zJ 0
,
yJ 0 − yV 0+yV 0zJ 0
zJ0
, 1),590
L ∗(aV ) = (1, 1, 0).591
Proof: Please see Appendix E.592
Remark 5: In the above case, we note that the stakelberg593
equilibrium of the system is independent of the initial flight594
height zJ 0, and the optimal flight height z∗J is a constant. The595
optimal communication trajectory of the virtual user satisfies596
{(x∗V , y∗V , 0)|(x∗V , y∗V , 0) ∈ Si, x∗V = y∗V }. In particular,597
L ∗(aV ) = (0, 0, 0) has no physical meaning in practice, and598
L ∗(aV ) = (1, 1, 0) is a special case.599
2) Time Complexity Analysis: The total time complexity of600
anti-intelligent UAV jamming strategy mainly depends on the601
all convolutional layers, which can be defined as [39]602
O
( 2∑
m=1
Fm−1n2mFmμ2m
)
, (25)603
where m is the index of convolutional layer, the symbol Fm−1604
is the number input channels of the m-th layer, i.e., F0 = 1,605
the symbol μm is the spatial size of the output feature map of606
the m-th convolutional layer.607
In our developed CNN, the number of the convolutional608
layer m = 2. Thus, with regard to the first convolutional layer,609
each filter has size n1 × n1 with stride 1, it inputs a n × n610
matrix, then outputs a feature map with size (n−n1+1). With611
each filter size n2×n2 and stride 1, the second convolutional612
layer inputs a (n− n1 + 1) matrix and outputs a feature map613
with size (n−n1−n2+2). The total testing time complexity614
of the proposed strategy can be obtained via (25). Meanwhile,615
since the CNN training includes one forward propagation616
and two backward propagation, the training time complexity617
is roughly three times of the testing time complexity [39].618
Therefore, the time complex of the proposed defense strategy619
is given in table II.620
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS621
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the anti-622
jamming elude game via simulations. In the simulations,623
the transmit power of the base station is pB = 100 mW,624
the jamming power of the UAV is pJ = 30 mW, the noise625
Fig. 4. The ergodic immediate reward of the virtual user at different location.
The UAV is at (−10 m, 20 m, 50 m) and state changes 1000 times.
power is σ2 = 1 mW, the unit energy cost of the UAV jammer 626
is Cj = 0.9 dB ≈ 1.23 mW and the unit energy cost of the 627
virtual user is CU = 0.5 dB ≈ 1.12 mW. From [32], we set the 628
path-loss exponents for air-to-ground channel α = 3, ground- 629
to-ground channel η = 2, and the additional attenuation factors 630
βLoS = 1 dB, βNLoS = 20 dB, respectively. The location of the 631
base station is (0, 0, 0) and the initial location of the virtual 632
user is calculated by (9). The virtual user can move in a square 633
area with size X × Y × 1, and the UAV jammer can move in 634
a cube area with size X×Y ×Z , where X ∈ [−30 m, 30 m], 635
Y ∈ [−30 m, 30 m], and Z ∈ [0 m, 30 m]. To simplify 636
simulation, the CSI is set to be real number, which changes in 637
each time slot, and the size of state S is set to be 50. Likewise, 638
the size of state SJ is also set to be 50. The neural network 639
consists of 2 hidden layers with the discount factor γ = 0.95, 640
and greedy rate  = 0.1. 641
As the channel environment is dynamic, it is difficult to 642
directly analyze the immediate reward. Thus, we analyze the 643
immediate reward based on the ergodic immediate reward. 644
Fig. 4. shows the tangent plane of ergodic immediate reward of 645
virtual user in different location, corresponding to the location 646
of the UAV is (−10 m, 20 m, 50 m). Some interesting insights 647
are obtained. For instance, with the distance between virtual 648
user and base station decreases, the immediate reward received 649
by the virtual user increases. In particular, such increasing 650
trend is non-linear and the ergodic immediate reward of the 651
virtual user is maximum at (0 m, 0 m, 0 m). For example, when 652
coordinate x = 0 m is fixed, the coordinate y changes from 653
−10 m to −7.5 m which increases 0.25 dB ergodic immediate 654
reward, and from −7.5 m to −5 m which increases 0.65 dB 655
ergodic immediate reward. 656
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Fig. 5. The ergodic immediate reward of the UAV jammer at different
location. The virtual user is at (5 m, −5 m) and the state changes 1000 times.
Fig. 6. The long-term cumulative rewards of the UAV jammer in DRQN,
greedy, random and Q-learning strategy in 300 time slots.
When the location of the virtual user is (5 m, −5 m, 0 m),657
making state s change 1000 times, the ergodic immediate658
reward of the UAV jammer is shown in Fig. 5. We find that659
the tangent plane of the ergodic immediate reward can be660
approximated to a hemisphere. It shows that the closer the dis-661
tance between virtual user and UAV jammer is, the higher the662
ergodic immediate reward will be. In addition, we observe that663
the ergodic immediate reward decreases with the increasing664
flight height zJ and it decreases rapidly when the coordinate665
y is greater than 2 m. The reason is that the gradient of the666
edge is large, which leads to the immediate reward decreases667
rapidly. The result suggests that if the attacker only launches668
jamming in one time slot, the UAV jammer should stay close669
to the virtual user as soon as possible to obtain a high ergodic670
immediate reward. Furthermore, one interesting observation is671
that the ergodic immediate reward is symmetric about x = 5672
under the parameters setting above.673
The long-term cumulative rewards of the UAV jammer674
in 300 time slots is presented in Fig. 6. We leverage the675
greedy strategy, random strategy and Q-learning strategy as676
Fig. 7. The long-term cumulative rewards of the virtual user in DQN, greedy,
random and Q-learning strategy in 300 time slots.
benchmark methods and compare them with the proposed 677
DRQN based intelligent jamming strategy. Since the greedy 678
strategy and the random strategy do not consider a series of 679
time events, for these two strategies, the long-term cumulative 680
rewards are equal to immediate rewards. We find that the long- 681
term cumulative reward via DRQN can converge to 21.2 dB 682
after 200 time slots. However, due to the state spaces are large, 683
the Q-learning strategy cannot update the Q-table effectively. 684
Thus, the convergence speed of Q-learning is slower than 685
DRQN based strategy. And, even after 300 time slots, the 686
Q-learning based strategy cannot converge to a fixed value. 687
The performance of the proposed strategy is already superior 688
to the greedy strategy and the random strategy after 25 time 689
slots. For example, the proposed strategy can achieve 75% 690
higher long-term cumulative reward than the greedy reward in 691
the 200-th time slot. In benchmark methods, we also find that 692
the greedy strategy can achieve a better performance than the 693
random strategy, and the Q-learning based strategy is the best 694
of the three. 695
We obtain the long-term cumulative rewards of the vir- 696
tual user in Fig. 7. The result suggests that the long-term 697
cumulative reward via DQN can converge to 22.3 dB after 698
100 time slots. After 10 time slots, the DQN based strategy 699
has already get a higher long-term cumulative reward than 700
random and greedy strategies. Then, after 20 time slots, 701
the proposed strategy is better than the Q-learning base strat- 702
egy. In summary, these two figures show that both the UAV 703
jammer and the virtual user can obtain the highest long-term 704
cumulative rewards via the proposed strategy, respectively. 705
That is, the stackelberg equilibrium exists after the long-term 706
cumulative reward converges. 707
Fig. 8. presents the optimal jamming trajectory of the UAV 708
and the optimal communication trajectory of the virtual user in 709
one episode. We observe that the communication location of 710
the virtual user starts at (−2 m, 1 m, 0 m) and ends at (15 m, 711
18 m, 0 m) and the jamming location of the UAV starts at 712
(0 m, 0 m, 10 m) and ends at (15 m, 15 m, 0 m). To obtain 713
the maximum long-term cumulative reward, the UAV jammer 714
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Fig. 8. The optimal trajectories via learning in one episode, the UAV jammer
via DRQN vs. the virtual user via DQN.
will not prefer to stay close to the virtual user in each time715
slot as analyzed in Fig. 5. The reason is that the CSI is time716
varying in each time slot, the UAV jammer will consider the717
CSI transition probability to maximize long-term cumulative718
reward rather than considering the instantaneous CSI only.719
V. CONCLUSIONS720
In this paper, we have proposed the anti-intelligent UAV721
jamming strategy via deep Q-networks. Specifically, we have722
formulated the anti-UAV jamming problem as a stackelberg723
dynamic game, in which the UAV jammer acts as a leader and724
the users act as followers. We have modeled the leader sub-725
game as a partially observable Markov decision process and726
have learned the optimal jamming trajectory via deep recurrent727
Q-networks in the three-dimension space. Then, we have mod-728
eled the follower sub-game as a Markov decision process. The729
optimal communication trajectory has been learned via deep730
Q-networks in the two-dimension space. The time complexity731
of the defense strategy has been analyzed via theory and732
the performance of the proposed defense strategy has been733
evaluated by simulations. Some insightful remarks have been734
obtained: 1) If the optimal trajectory of virtual user exists,735
the optimal communication trajectory of each user is existent736
but is not unique. 2) In quasi-static block fading, the stakelberg737
equilibrium of the system is independent of the initial flight738
height, and the optimal flight height is a constant. 3) To739
maximize long-term cumulative reward, the action choices740
of UAV jammer is different from that of maximizing the741
immediate reward.742
APPENDIX A743
PROOF OF THEOREM 1744
The action transition probability of UAV jammer can be745
divided into two cases based on -greedy policy πJ .746
Case 1: If the UAV jammer chooses the optimal action a′J ∗747
in the next time slot, then748
P (a′J
∗|aJ ) = P (o′, a′J ∗|o, aJ )749
= P (a′J
∗)P (o′|o, aJ )750
= (1− )P (o′|o, aJ ). (26)751
Case 2: If the UAV jammer chooses the non-optimal action 752
a˜′J
∗
in the next time slot, then 753
P (a˜′J
∗|aJ ) = P (o′, a˜′J
∗|o, aJ ) 754
= P (a˜′J
∗
)P (o′|o, aJ ) 755
= P (o′|o, aJ ), (27) 756
where the action aJ ∈ {a∗J , a˜J ∗}. As per (26) (27), we have 757
the action transition probability P (a′J |aJ ) = P (o′|o, aJ ). 758
Given current action aJ , we note that the next action a′J 759
is independent of the previous action, which has a Markov 760
property. Then proof is completed. 761
APPENDIX B 762
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 763
Taking the second derivative of function f(c1, · · · , cU ), 764
we can get the Hessian matrix 765
∂2 f(c1, · · · , cU )
∂2c1, · · · , cU =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂2f
∂c21
∂2f
∂c1∂c2
· · · ∂
2f
∂c1∂cU
∂2f
∂c2∂c1
∂2f
∂c22
· · · ∂
2f
∂c2∂cU
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
∂2f
∂cU∂c1
∂2f
∂cU∂c2
· · · ∂
2f
∂c2U
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. 766
(28) 767
According to (22), we can obtain 768
∂2f
∂ci∂cj
= 0, i, j ∈ {1, · · ·U}, i = j, 769
∂2 f1(c1)
∂2c1
 0, 770
.
.
. 771
∂2 f1(c1)
∂2c1
+ · · ·+ ∂
2 f1(cU )
∂2cU
 0, (29) 772
and deduce that the Hessian matrix is positive definite. 773
The result indicates that f(c1, · · · , cU ) is a convex func- 774
tion, therefore, there is an optimal solution that satisfies 775
f∗(c1, · · · , cU ) = f∗1 (c1) + · · · + f∗U (cU ), and the proof is 776
completed. 777
APPENDIX C 778
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 779
Substituting wi into (9), we can obtain the linear represen- 780
tation among users, which are 781
(xV , yV , 0) = (w1x1 + · · ·+ wUxU , w1y1 + · · ·+ wUyU , 0) 782
= w1(x1, y1, 0) + · · ·+ wU (xU , yU , 0). (30) 783
Since the Q-values with respect to the locations of the users, 784
we can get 785
Q(ϕ, aV ; ξ) ∝ Q(ϕ1, ai; ξ1) + · · ·+ Q(ϕU , aU ; ξU ), (31) 786
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where ϕi, ξi,∈ {1, · · · , U} is the DQN parameter of each user.787
According to Lemma 1, we have788
Q∗(ϕ, aV ; ξ)∝Q∗(ϕ1, ai; ξ1) + · · ·+ Q∗(ϕU , aU ; ξU ). (32)789
Then, we can get790
(xV , yV , 0)∗=w1(x1, y1, 0)∗+· · ·+ wU (xU , yU , 0)∗, (33)791
which shows that all users have effectively learned the opti-792
mal communication trajectory to maximum its long-term793
cumulative reward, if and only if the virtual user obtains794
the optimal communication trajectory L ∗V . Then proof is795
completed.796
APPENDIX D797
PROOF OF THEOREM 3798
As the leader, the UAV jammer first chooses the action799
atJ ∈ AJ to maximize its long-term cumulative reward in800
each time slot t. For any a−J ∈ A−J , we have the following801
RJ [T ∗(atJ ),L (a
t−1
V )] ≥ RJ [T (at−J ),L (at−1V )],802
where A−J is the action space except the action aJ . Then,803
as the follower, the virtual user observes the action of the804
leader and chooses the action atV ∈ AV to maximize its805
long-term cumulative reward RV [T ∗(atJ ),L ∗(atV )]. For any806
a−V ∈ A−V , we have the following807
RV [T ∗(atJ ),L
∗(atV )] ≥ RV [T ∗(atJ ),L (at−V )],808
where A−V is the action space except the action aV . For any809
a−J ∈ A−J and a−V ∈ A−V , we can obtain810
RJ [T ∗(atJ ),L
∗(atV )] ≥ RJ [T (at−J ),L (atV )],811
RV [T ∗(atJ ),L
∗(atV )] ≥ RV [T (atJ ),L (at−V )]. (34)812
Based on (24), the proof is completed.813
APPENDIX E814
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1815
Substituting (3) into (10) and defining K + J = pJPLoS816
βLoS + pJPNLoSβNLoS, we can get immediate reward in (35),817
which is shown at the bottom of this page.818
According to Lagrange multiplier 819
F (xJ , yJ , zJ , λJ )=rJ [T (aJ ),L (aV )] + λJ (|aJ | − 1) 820
(35) 821
and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, 822
∂F (xJ , yJ , zJ , λJ )
∂xJ
= 0 823
∂F (xJ , yJ , zJ , λJ )
∂yJ
= 0 824
∂F (xJ , yJ , zJ , λJ )
∂zJ
= 0 (36) 825
λJ (|aJ | − 1) = 0 826
λJ ≥ 0, 827
we obtain 828
T ∗(aJ )=(
xJ 0 − xV 0+xV 0zJ 0
zJ0
,
yJ 0 − yV 0 + yV 0zJ 0
zJ 0
, 1). 829
Defining 830
(x∗J , y
∗
J , z
∗
J ) 831
= (
xJ 0 − xV 0 + xV 0zJ 0
zJ 0
,
yJ 0 − yV 0 + yV 0zJ 0
zJ 0
, 1) 832
(37) 833
and substituting (3) into (5), we can get immediate reward 834
in (39), which is presented at the bottom of this page. 835
Similarly, if the initial location of the UAV jammer and 836
the virtual user satisfies xJ 0 = yJ 0 and xV 0 = yV 0, using 837
Lagrange multiplier and KKT conditions, 838
F (xV , yV , 0, λV ) = rV [T ∗(aJ ),L (aV )] + λV (|aV | − 1) 839
(40) 840
∂F (xV , yV , 0, λV )
∂xV
= 0 841
∂F (xV , yV , 0, λV )
∂yV
= 0 (41) 842
λV (|aV | − 1) = 0 843
λV ≥ 0, 844
we have x∗V = y∗V . Then, we derive that L ∗(aV ) = (1, 1, 0) 845
is one of the optimal solution for the virtual user in this special 846
case. 847
rJ [T (aJ ),L (aV )] =
(K + J )
(√
(xJ − xV 0)2 + (yJ − yV 0)2 + z2J
)−α
pb
((√
x2V 0 + y
2
V 0 + H
2
B
)−η|h˜BV |2 + σ2
)
−CJ
√
(xJ − xJ 0)2 + (yJ − yJ 0)2 + (zJ − zJ 0)2 (35)
rV [T ∗(aJ ),L (aV )] =
pB
(√
x2V + y
2
V + H
2
B
)−η
|h˜BV |2
(K + J )
(√
(xV − x∗J )2 + (yV − y∗J )2 + z∗2J
)−α − CV√(xV − xV 0)2 + (yV − yV 0)2 (39)
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